

Abstract

Along with the increasing incidence of multinational military interventions, civil-military-coordination (CIMIC) is of growing interest to policymakers, scientists and practitioners from the military and from relief organisations. In this respect, human resources concepts are of tremendous importance. The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) have developed a two-pillar approach for their assignment of CIMIC personnel. One pillar is made up of so-called all-rounders, regular soldiers, who are trained to work on general tasks connected to CIMIC. Functional specialists (lawyers, architects, farmers), who most often are from the reserve force, form the second pillar of the Bundeswehr's staff concept. They are assigned to a military mission, carrying arms but working in their particular field of expertise. Problems observed are distrust between regulars and soldiers from the reserve or the interference of superiors in the field of expertise of functional specialists, for example. Against this backdrop, the classic principal-agent (PA) framework, a concept developed in the institutional economics literature to study contractual relations in the face of information asymmetry, provides an explanation of the moral hazard problem and certain incentive issues. This paper aims at utilising the PA approach to explain those problems arising from the Bundeswehr's human resources concept with regard to CIMIC.

Source:

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